io.webcrank:webcrank-password_2.10

webcrank-password


License
BSD-3-Clause

Documentation

webcrank-password

Build Status

A toolkit for dealing with passwords. Provides key-derivation and verification.

This library has the following goals:

  • Secure by default: sensible algorithm choices, sensible defaults, sensible guidance.
  • Ease of use: should be clean and easy, removing any chance of accidental misuse, and assist in helping users understanding safe password storage.
  • Future proof: should allow for adjustment and modification of parameters over time with minimal impact on code.
Supported algorithms Default parameters
scrypt N = 65536 (2 ^ 16). r = 8, p = 1
bcrypt cost = 12
PBKDF2 rounds = 65536 (2 ^ 16), salt length: 16 bytes, key size: 256 bits, digest: sha1

Note that this library has no dependencies on the rest of webcrank and can be used independently.

Getting webcrank-password

If you're using SBT, add the following dependency to your build file:

"io.webcrank" %% "webcrank-password" % "0.3"

Using webcrank-password

Simply import, build an implementation with appropriate parameters, and call crypt/verify as required.

import webcrank.password._

val passwords = Passwords.scrypt()

// crypted string is safe to store in db or elsewhere as required
val crypted = passwords.crypt("password")

// return true in this case where the password matches
passwords.verify("password", crypted)

// return false in this case where the password does not match
passwords.verify("fido", crypted)

Example configurations:

// scrypt with default cost parameters
val passwords = Passwords.scrypt()

// bcrypt with default cost parameters
val passwords = Passwords.bcrypt()

// pbkdf2 with default cost parameters, key size and digest
val passwords = Passwords.pbkdf2()

// scrypt with specified value for N: 65536 (2 ^ 16)
val passwords = Passwords.scrypt(n = 65536)

// bcrypt with specified cost parameters,
// note: cost is caluclated as 2^{cost} in bcrypt
val passwords = Passwords.bcrypt(cost = 12)

// PBKDF2 with specified rounds, 16384 (2 ^ 14)
val passwords = Passwords.pbkdf2(rounds = 16384)

// PBKDF2 with alternative HMAC digest, SHA256
// note: pbkdf2 with HMAC-SHA256 is only available
// on JDK8 or with a custom JCE provider such as
// IAIK or BSAFE.
val passwords = Passwords.pbkdf2(digest = SHA256)

// PBKDF2 with alternative HMAC digest, SHA512
// note: PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA512 is only available
// on JDK8 or with a custom JCE provider such as
// IAIK or BSAFE.
val passwords = Passwords.pbkdf2(digest = SHA512)

// PBKDF2 with specified rounds, 16384 (2 ^ 14)
val passwords = Passwords.pbkdf2(rounds = 16384)

// PBKDF2 with specified rounds and alternative HMAC digest
// note: pbkdf2 with HMAC-SHA256 is only available
// on JDK8 or with a custom JCE provider such as
// IAIK or BSAFE.
val passwords = Passwords.pbkdf2(rounds = 16384, digest = SHA256)

Password storage is up to you, but the crypt output is just a string, so can be easily stored in a database or similar.

Security considerations

Each algorithm has sensible defaults, but consider careful research and potentailly doing computation tests on your hardware to make the most appropriate choice (read as: set as high as you can before the performance becomes crippling).

In terms of algorithms selection there are a few factors that should be considered:

  • work factors of algorithm
  • availability of algorithm
  • trust of underlying implementation
  • validation requirements

Work factors

Work factors of underlying algorithm is also difficult to classify because of the number of variables invloved (CPU, Memory, etc...).

Reading is possibly the only solution, but it is worth noting that scrypt was specifically designed to be more difficult to run with modern computing constraints (or lack there of) on FGPAs and alike. Scrypt is build on top of PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA256. The scrypt paper has some insight into this.

In terms of choosing appropriate factors, measurement is often the best approach. As a general rule, for interactive password storage (such as for a web app), you would want to tune the algorithm so password generation takes ~100ms. There are some factors listed in the OWASP password cheatsheet which is a pretty good source of information.

Availability of algorithm

Of the provided algorithms scrypt, bcrypt and PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA1 are always available. PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA256 or HMAC-SHA512 are only available on JDK8 or with a custom JCE provider such as IAIK or BSAFE.

The fact that PBKDF2 is stuck with HMAC-SHA1 by default potentially makes it less desirable.

Trust of underlying implementaion

Obviously this is difficult to measure, but all implementations are open source and can be audited:

There is some ongoing effort to complete a review of the scrypt and bcrypt implementations.

Validation requirements

Validation requirements are easier. You should know if you have them. PBKDF2 is the only NIST approved algorithm.

Algorithm migration

One careful design decision of this library is to make it easy to migrate algorithms, or the more likely scenario of modifying the cost parameters over time.

How does this library help?

So the first thing to note is that the algorithm choice, and cost parameters only affect the behaviour of crypt. The parameters are then embedded in a Modular Crypt Format (MCF) style string that encodes the algorithm, any parameters, the salt and the derived key. This encoded information is used for password verification.

Modular Crypt Format (MCF) Strings

MCF strings can basically be described as:

$identifier$content

They are no more then a loose convention, but they work pretty well for what we want to achieve. The content part is a '$' seperated list, of the parameters salt and derived key. Each component is base64 (or in bcrypt's case base64 like) encoded to remove ambiguity.

Scrypt and bcrypt have well recognised MCF formats, and this library should interoperate with other implementations.

PBKDF2 only specifies the key derivation, and this library defines its on format string.

Identifiers supported by this library:

algorithm MCF identifier
scrypt s0
bcrypt 2 and 2a
PBKDF2 PBKDF2WithHMACSHA1, PBKDF2WithHMACSHA256 and PBKDF2WithHMACSHA512

Note the long winded PBKDF2 identifiers are based upon the JCE algorithm names for consistency.

So really how do I migrate?

Basically just update how you create the passwords implementation.

For example, using bcrypt with cost = 11, and moving to cost = 12:

val passwords = Passwords.bcrypt(cost = 11)

Becomes:

val passwords = Passwords.bcrypt(cost = 12)

Everything else remains the same. All existing passwords will still verify, any new passwords will be generated with new parameters.

In case it isn't clear, this means you will have multiple types of crypted passwords over time.

If you are changing the parameters because something bad happened (e.g. you chose poor parameters in the past, or an algorithm was broken), you will potentially want to force recreation of all passwords, but this is application specific behaviour. OWASP password cheatsheet provides some guidance on dealing with this sort of issue.

Interoperability

The bcrypt and scrypt implentations use standard MCF strings and should be fully compatible with other implementations.

The PBKDF2 implementations uses a custom MCF format, if you want to use it with another PBKDF2 implementation you will need to understand the following format:

$algorithm$rounds$keysize$base64(salt)$base64(key)

Where algorithm is one of: PBKDF2WithHMACSHA1, PBKDF2WithHMACSHA256 and PBKDF2WithHMACSHA512.

Any interop failure would be considered a serious bug, please report.

Compatability

Compatability is paramount to the utility of this library.

All algorithms currently supported, will be supported for verify indefinitely.

All algorithms currently supported, will be supported for crypt, unless a serious issue occurs where something is no longer deemed safe for password storage.

If you choose to take the defaults, there is no guarantee that they will not change. These defaults will be upgraded to what is considered an acceptible level of security over time. However, this should not affect your usage of the libary.

Any compatability failure would be considered a serious bug, please report.

Contributing

Any contributions welcome, in particular any security reviews on this library, its recommendations or the underlying crypto libraries would be very helpful.

The issue tracker is up to date with anything that is planned / desired.

Note that it is unlikely that new algorithms will be added unless they are deemed significantly better than what is currently available. If unsure, just raise an issue to start the discussion.